Discussions regarding the functional design of second chambers in federal or quasifederal systems seem to focus mainly on legislative functions. Thus, extra-or nonlegislative functions related to the executive branch or the judiciary have been rather neglected in the literature. This paper will examine the extra-legislative functions of second chambers which include Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. By grouping the functions into different categories (relations with the Government, appointment functions and functions in the field of international affairs, powers in relation to the European Union and functions granted to maintain the legitimate constitutional order), their effectiveness in serving the purposes of bicameralism, and of regional representation, will be explored.
Introduction
Bicameralism as a model of parliamentary design has been adopted in many parliamentary democracies (Russell 2001a: 442) . Among the justifications put forward for a second chamber are the separation of powers to avoid the risk of abuse entailed by concentrating power into a single body and the enhancement of democracy by drawing on a broader and more diversified base (Luther 2006: 20-21) . By representing 'different interests from those represented in the first chamber' (Russell 2001a: 443) and by providing for more independent scrutiny of the executive (Russell 2001a: 447-448) , the value of checks and balances is enhanced (Watts 2006: 14) . The importance of check and balances holds true not only for legislative functions, but also for extra-legislative functions attributed to Parliaments and underlines the essential role of control in a parliamentary democracy.
In federal (and in regionalised) states, which almost all feature second chambers (Watts 2006: 2) , the different interests represented by a second chamber are those of the subnational units and are therefore of a territorial nature (Palermo and Kössler 2017: 164) .
The main reason for this is that participation in central decision-making compensates for subnational units' loss of sovereignty (Palermo and Kössler 2017: 164) . In addition, a second chamber provides a forum for debate among the different territorial levels and directly or indirectly links the national Parliament to regional legislatures and executives (Russell 2001b: 109) .
When discussing the functions of federal or non-federal second chambers the focus is mostly on legislative powers, including powers of constitutional amendment and in financial and budgetary matters. Much less attention is given to extra-legislative functions, for example scrutiny of the Government, or participation in international affairs or appointment powers.
Against this background, the paper examines non-legislative powers of second Chambers in federal or quasi-federal systems by looking at the German and the Austrian Bundesrat, the Swiss Council of States, the Senates of Belgium, Spain and Italy and the House of Lords as a case of its own. Firstly, extra-legislative powers will be grouped into different categories such as relations with the Government, appointment functions and 
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functions in the field of international affairs, powers in relation to the European Union and functions granted to maintain the legitimate constitutional order. Secondly, considerations will be made on the effectiveness of extra-legislative powers attributed to federal or quasifederal second chambers in representing territorial interests.
Functions vis-à-vis the Government
Functions of second chambers vis-à-vis the Government mainly include oversight and control functions of governmental activities, but can also themselves be of an administrative nature. Instruments may vary from the vote of confidence (or no confidence), essential for the Government to remain in power, to general or more specific scrutiny powers towards governmental actions including means to voice (non-binding) suggestions for the Government.
Generally, a confidence vote, as the strongest means of parliamentary control over governmental actions, is a prerogative of parliamentary chambers elected directly by the people. Therefore, it is not typically a function of second chambers in federal or regionalised systems that are supposed to represent the interests of the territorial level (Russell 2001b: 447) . This is clearly shown by the example of the Italian Senate which holds the power of the confidence vote.
I Italian Senators are directly elected, albeit on a regional basis, but this criterion refers only to the delimitation of the constituencies. II The Constituent Assembly rejected the idea of a body representing vocational categories or regional interests, therefore construing the Italian Senate as a popular second chamber of reflection (Ferrara 1984: 23-25) .
The means to scrutinise and monitor the activities of the Government include questions put to the Government, motions approved to give political directions to the executive or enquiries conducted and reports elaborated by committees, generally in addition to their legislative work. Through these instruments, second chambers can exert political pressure and shape the political mood by tackling specific matters of relevance to the regional level. An example is the General committee for the Autonomous Communities in the Spanish Senate: in addition to its legislative work in the area of territorial issues, the General committee carries out inquiries and conducts debates in relation to the regions (Russell 2001: 111-112 
Appointment Functions
Second chambers may exercise, alone or together with other constitutional organs, a range of appointment rights with regard to the executive branch and to the judiciary (Palermo and Kössler 2017: 193 
Functions Related to International Affairs
In the area of international affairs, second chambers can be involved in the ratification and implementation of international treaties, thus participating in national treaty-making power (Palermo and Kössler 2017: 199) . In Austria, pursuant to article 50(2 subsection 2) Federal Constitutional Law, the Bundesrat has to consent to each 'political' or legislationaffecting treaty concerning the powers of the Länder. This function is interpreted in extensive manner, covering all treaties with a potential to curtail or influence Länder powers (Öhlinger 2013: 2). Similarly, the German Basic Law states in Article 59(2) that treaties are incorporated by federal law into the German legal system and thus require the consent or participation of the bodies responsible for their enactment -including potentially that of the German Bundesrat in accordance with the respective subject-matter. Therefore, the German Bundesrat retains a veto right in the area of international treaties which parallels its powers in the legislative area.
In some cases, second chambers exercise their treaty making powers together with the first chamber. This is the case in Spain where, according to Article 94(1) of the Constitution, treaties related to subject-matters of some importance, such as treaties of a political nature, treaties affecting the territorial integrity of the state, or treaties implying the amendment or the repeal of laws can be only ratified by prior authorization from the Cortes Generales, composed of the Congress and the Senate.
XVII The decision is taken in a joint session by a majority vote in each of the Houses, the procedure being initiated by the 
Functions Related to the European Union
The 
Second Chambers as Guarantors of the Constitutional Order
The last category of extra-legislative functions is linked to guaranteeing the constitutional order. In addition to their role in processes of constitutional amendment, second chambers may also be provided with powers in relation to sustaining the legitimate constitutional order, including functions in constitutionally defined emergency situations like breaches of the constitutional duties by constitutional organs or by the subnational units themselves. In this regard, the additional role of second chambers, in maintaining the principle of separation of powers from a territorial point of view, is of particular importance, constituting an additional form of control over the executive vested with emergency powers.
In some cases second chambers may initiate or take part in impeachment procedures. 
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As one can easily see from this certainly not exhaustive overview of extra-legislative functions of second chambers, these powers cover a wide range of subjects. In addition, chambers matching both the ambassadorial and senatorial models are provided with such powers. Thus, to answer the question if they entail an effective representation of subnational interests, other aspects must be considered.
The first criterion that comes to mind is the nature of the functions in regard to their exclusivity. Palermo and Nicolini (2013: 192-201) 
